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Abstract This paper shows that the traditional equitable doctrine,
which protected the rights of a prepaid buyer of future or unascertained
goods, was wrongly perceived as being overruled by the judgment of a
single Court of Appeal judge. What followed, however, was consider-
able judicial reluctance by English courts to remedy this error. The
article examines various legislative and judicial approaches from major
common law jurisdictions around the world that purport to lessen the
potential for injustice created by this judicial caution. Yet despite legis-
lative intervention in England to provide limited remedies, there has
been a marked reluctance elsewhere to produce the necessary radical
reform suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Ontario. The
position in Ireland is examined and the authors note that the time may
be ripe for a reconsideration of the current statutory provisions in
that jurisdiction.
Introduction
As the primary objective of a contract for the sale of goods is to effect
the passing of property in the goods in return for some consider-
ation, the ability to pass that property and the time of the passing
of that property are very important. While these matters may give rise
to certain complexities where specific goods are concerned, they
become more intricate when unascertained or future goods
are involved.
There are two aspects to this issue. On the one hand there is the
potential financial loss for a prepaying buyer of goods in the event
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that the seller is declared insolvent. On the other hand some certainty
about the passing of property is necessary for any putative act of
borrowing and the giving of security by the buyer over such un-
ascertained goods. Ensuring that the passing of property is effected
becomes more complicated when the contract goods are commingled
and there is more than one seller but this article does not include
within its ambit a detailed examination of commingled goods .
This article first seeks in Part I to define the concept of specific,
future or unascertained goods in terms of a spectrum, based on the
time at which the contract goods are to be identified. If that is
the case, then the justification for a resolute difference between treat-
ments of contracts for specific goods and those for future/
unascertained goods becomes less sustainable. Then it will be shown
in Part II that the traditional equitable doctrine which protected the
rights of a prepaid buyer of future/unascertained goods was wrongly
perceived as being overruled by the judgment of a single Court of
Appeal judge. Part III of the article highlights judicial reluctance to
remedy this error, despite some precedents that showed a relaxed
approach to legislative appropriation in contracts for future/
unascertained goods. Part IV also examines the legislative interven-
tion in England, intended to provide some relief from the clear
injustice created. Finally, Part V constitutes a comparative analysis of
approaches taken in various common law countries, some of which
show a reluctance by both judiciary and legislature to make even
those marginal alterations made in England.
I. Specific, Future and Unascertained Goods
Future goods can be defined as those not in existence at the time the
contract was made. The term can also be extended to include those
goods that are not the property of the seller at the time the contract
was made, since though such a contract may actually appear to relate
to specific goods, inter partes the seller is purporting to sell something
which does not yet exist, namely his ownership of the subject-matter
of the contract. Unascertained goods arise where, at the time of
making the contract of sale, the precise goods being sold cannot be
specifically identified. This classification of unascertained goods can
be further refined into generic goods and quasi-specific goods.
Generic goods can be defined as those having particular charac-
teristics in common with other such goods made for sale to others.
Quasi-specific goods can be defined as those that have particular
characteristics but are to be taken from a specified larger bulk or
quantity that can be identified.1 Although the distinction can be useful,
there is no bright line that separates generic from quasi-specific
1 R. Goode, Commercial Law , 2nd edn (Butterworths: London, 1995) 215.
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goods. It will depend on the specificity with which the particular
characteristics are detailed in the contract.
Further analysis leads to the logical conclusion that specific, future
and unascertained goods (both quasi-specific and generic) are simply
different elements of the same spectrum in terms of identification of
the subject-matter of the contract. First, quasi-specific goods may be
specified with such accuracy that the contract is essentially a contract
for specified goods. On the other hand, the particulars may be so
vague as to render it closer to a contract for generic goods, or even
future goods. For example, how should one classify a contract with a
car dealership for the purchase of a Toyota Camry? Car manufac-
turers now employ on-demand production techniques, so such a con-
tract may amount to a contract for a good not yet in existence, i.e. a
future good, but one which will be manufactured next week. Or it
could be classified as a generic good, that is, any Toyota Camry which
is in existence, and that might be sourced from anywhere. Or it could
be classified as a quasi-specific good, that is, a good from the overall
stock of Toyota Camrys in the dealership. The significant factor is that
such a contract, no matter how we classify the goods, differs in
quality from one where the consumer enters into a contract to pur-
chase the Toyota he or she has just taken for a test drive.
Second, at some stage even unascertained or future goods must
become specific goods: the issue is timing. In a contract for the sale of
specific goods, identification of the subject-matter of the contract is
contemporaneous with the making of the contract. In contracts for
sale of future or unascertained goods, identification takes place, if at
all, only after the contract has been made. However, the expectation of
the parties in contracts for future or unascertained goods is that those
goods should become specific at some point. Thus we can usefully
distinguish between such contracts and a contract of chance.2 In a
contract of chance, the parties understand that the future or unascer-
tained goods may never become specific. Indeed there is an argument
that such contracts are not contracts for the sale of goods, but are
essentially wagers, even if they do not technically fall foul of the public
policy rules on gaming.3
Third, the common law also distinguished between future/
unascertained goods and what was termed potential property. Poten-
tial property refers to those goods which, though not yet in existence,
were the natural produce or expected increase of that which was
already the seller’s property. The most obvious example of this would
be the sale of hay that was not yet ready for harvest. As far as the law
was concerned, such sales constituted an immediate sale of specific
goods.4 In H.R.& S. Sainsbury Ltd v Street 5 a farmer entered into an
2 Sometimes referred to as the sale of a spes.
3 Ellesere v Wallace [1929] Ch 1.
4 Howell v Coupland (1876) 1 QBD 258 (CA).
5 [1972] 3 All ER 1127.
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agreement with some corn merchants for the sale of feed barley to be
grown on his land that summer. Both parties agreed that the harvest
would be in the order of 275 tons. In fact the harvest fell well short at
140 tons. The farmer refused to deliver this harvest to the buyer and
the buyer pursued an action for non-delivery under the contract. The
court held that at common law the farmer was obliged to deliver
the harvest to the buyer, even where the harvest fell short of that
which the parties had agreed.6 The farmer was excused with respect
to the shortfall but essentially the harvest had passed at the making of
the contract. The case is explicable if one views the differences be-
tween specific and future/unascertained goods as one of degree and
not substance. In potential property, one does not have to wait for the
harvest to identify the contract goods since in essence the contract
relates to specific goods not yet certain.
It is submitted therefore that the only meaningful distinction is that
between contracts for specific goods and contracts for non-specific
goods (future goods or unascertained goods). That being the case, it is
now appropriate to examine the common law position with respect to
non-specific goods on the basis that common rules apply equally
to future and to unascertained goods.
II. The Common Law
Traditionally, the law relating to future goods differed between com-
mon law and equity. Under common law, the mere coming into being
of the future goods had no legal impact, whereas this was not the case
in equity. In Holroyd v Marshall7 it was held that the buyer acquired
an equitable right to the goods as soon as they came into existence.
Such right was superior to all other rights save that of a purchaser for
value without notice of the buyer’s prior equitable right. All that was
required was that the goods which came into existence matched those
described under the contract in question.8
The passing of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 appears to have put this
approach into question, although the reasons why are not fully clear.
In Re Wait,9 Wait had bought a quantity of wheat to be transported on
a particular ship. He resold one half of that quantity of wheat to a
buyer who paid in advance. Before the ship delivered the wheat, Wait
was declared bankrupt. The majority of the Court of Appeal held that
the buyer was unable to claim any part of the ship’s cargo of wheat
because he owned no part of that cargo. The court was asked by
counsel whether the power under s. 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893
to order specific performance of a contract for the sale of specific or
6 It should be noted the court held that the 1893 Act did not alter the common law
position in this situation.
7 (1862) 11 ER 999 (HL).
8 Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 (HL).
9 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606.
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ascertained goods could be exercised in this case. The Court of Ap-
peal held that it could not grant an order for specific performance of
the contract because the purchaser’s wheat was not specific or ascer-
tained. The buyer had agreed to buy unascertained goods that had not
been separated from the bulk and identified with his contract. As the
goods were unascertained, s. 16 prevented property in those goods
passing to the buyer.10 For the part of a bulk being sold to be ascer-
tained for the purposes of s. 16, it seems it must be physically
separated from the bulk.
The case centred on the statutory power11 of the court to order
specific performance of a contract where the goods were specific or
ascertained. The trustee in bankruptcy asserted that the goods in
question were future goods and were never ‘unconditionally appro-
priated’12 under s. 18, Rule 5 so as to make the property in them pass
to sub-purchasers, the assertion being that the goods were therefore
neither specific nor ascertained. If he had succeeded, the goods would
have formed part of the pool of assets available in bankruptcy.
Lord Hanworth MR said, ‘there was no ascertainment or identifica-
tion’ of the 500 tons contracted for by the buyer from among the total
tonnage on board the vessel.13 In arriving at his judgment, Lord Han-
worth relied on Hayman & Son v M’Lintock14 and the emphasis by
Lord Maclaren in that case on the fact that ‘ as the sacks [of flour]
were neither numbered, nor marked, nor put into receptacles, nor
ascertained in such a way as to distinguish them from other flour’, no
transfer of ownership had been effected to sub-purchasers in that
case. Relying on that and other decisions Lord Hanworth concluded
that it was ‘not possible to hold that the 500 tons of wheat ex
motor vessel Challenger were specific or ascertained goods’.15 Lord
Hanworth also cited Snell v Heighton16 when considering whether
appropriation of the 500 tons of wheat had taken place. In that case
Grove J. had held there was no appropriation to a sale of 60,000 bricks
where the vendor had applied all of his existing stock of 117,000
bricks bar 62,000 to other purposes.
A careful reading of the judgment of Hanworth MR makes it clear
that his comments were confined to establishing that there was no
specific appropriation of the goods to the extent that was required to
bind the goods by equitable assignment. In no way did Hanworth MR
indicate that the 1893 Act overruled the traditional equitable ap-
proach and there is nothing in the majority reasoning of the Court of
10 Section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 provides that where there is a contract
for the sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to the
buyer unless and until the goods are identified.
11 Section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893.
12 Re Wait, above n.9 at 610.
13 See ibid. at 617.
14 Hayman & Son v M’Lintock [1907] SC 936.
15 See Re Wait, above n. 9 at 621.
16 Snell v Heighton (1883) Cab & Ell 95.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
54
Appeal that would suggest such a ratio. At best the case is sui generis
in that on the facts of the case at hand the equitable doctrine could not
apply. But it is not necessarily authority to overrule a previously well-
established doctrine.
However, another member of the Court of Appeal in that case,
Atkin LJ, did express the view that the 1893 Act had in fact overruled
the equitable doctrine. According to Atkin LJ, a contract to sell future
goods created no right of property even where the goods could be
subsequently identified unless such goods were specifically appro-
priated to the contract in accordance with the terms of the Act. It was
the view of Lord Atkin that goods are ascertained when they are
‘identified in accordance with the agreement after [the] contract is
made’.17 This means the goods must be identified by some act of
appropriation that takes place after the contract.
It is this view which appears, rightly or wrongly, to have taken hold,
within English common law and which also found support subse-
quently in other common law jurisdictions.18 In the Canadian case of
Olds Products Co v Montana Mustard Seed Co19 the court followed the
approach of Atkin LJ in Re Wait, confining the buyer to a remedy in
damages rather than conferring any property right. In Olds, the seller
agreed to sell to the buyer mustard seed to be grown in the future.
Despite having such seed in stock, he subsequently refused to deliver
any to the buyer. The buyer sought an injunction preventing the seller
from selling the mustard seed to other buyers. The injunction was
refused as the buyer had no property right. He could of course
exercise his legal right and seek common law redress in the form
of damages.
And herein may lie a small clue possibly as to why this particular
equitable doctrine failed in the view of many to survive the 1893
enactment (or similar enactments in other jurisdictions). Despite the
fact that the relevant legislative provisions often specifically preserved
equitable doctrines to the extent that they were reconcilable with
the express legislative provisions, this particular equitable doctrine
favours the equitable remedies of injunction and specific performance
over the common law remedy of damages. The common law, in con-
trast with civil law, generally prefers damages as an appropriate
contractual remedy.20 This view is based on the perception that per-
sonal remedies, such as specific performance of contractual obliga-
tions, are inappropriate in a contractual context. Where a contract is
17 See Re Wait, above n. 9 at 630.
18 Re CA McDonald & Co (1959) 2 CBR (NS) 326; 18 DLR (2d) 731 concerning the sale
of shares.
19 (1973) 37 DLR (3d) 625 (Sask. QB).
20 Société des Industries Metallurques v Bronx Engingeering Co [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
465; CN Marine Inc v Stena Line [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 336.
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personal in nature, that is, where there is a personal element to per-
formance of the obligations, courts are naturally reluctant to make
orders that might look suspiciously like indentured service. A fortiori,
where contracts are impersonal in nature, any breach can be resolved
most appropriately through monetary compensation. In civil law
jurisdictions, the emphasis is on personal remedies based on the
belief that contracts, irrespective of the nature of their obligations, are
essentially personal arrangements between people.21 In more modern
times, law and economics theorists have also argued that personal
remedies such as specific performance are more efficient than com-
pensatory awards.22
Moreover, some courts have questioned the appropriateness of
these restrictions on personal remedies such as specific performance
and injunctions even vis-à-vis future or unascertained goods. In Sky
Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd23 Goulding J awarded an injunction
restraining the defendant from breaking a contract with the buyer for
the sale of all the buyer’s petroleum requirements for the next ten
years. This was effectively an order for specific performance over
future goods.24
There is no evidence that emphasising compensatory remedies
over personal remedies, in cases of breach of contract, has any harm-
ful impact on the operation of commercial activities, and, indeed, such
an approach is more reflective of commercial practices. However,
failing to utilize remedies of specific performance will, in certain situa-
tions, result in an injustice; this is particularly so where one or more of
the parties is in default due to insolvency or bankruptcy or where
frustration of the contract occurs.
Nonetheless, the views of a single judge of the Court of Appeal,
Atkin LJ, have held sway for many years, and it is true to say that
there has been subsequent judicial support, albeit obiter in nature.25
Thus, in place of a symbiotic legislative and equitable approach to the
buyer’s rights in contracts for future or unascertained goods, there
exists a single legislative framework based on the cumbersome
process of appropriation.
21 T. Ulen, ‘The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of
Contract Remedies’ (1984) 83 Michigan Law Review 341; J.P. Dawson, ‘Specific
Performance in France and Germany’ (1959) 57 Michigan Law Review but cf.
H. Lando and C. Rose, ‘The Myth of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries’
American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings 2005, Paper 15
< http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article = 1014&context = alea >
(accessed 24 August 2006).
22 A. Schwartz, ‘The Case for Specific Performance’ (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271.
23 Sky Petroleum Ltd v VIP Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 954.
24 Although there is merit to the argument that the case refers to a contract for
supply rather than a contract for the sale of future goods, see Re London Wine
Shippers Ltd (1986) PCC 121,149.
25 Leigh & Sullivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Ltd ‘The Aliakmon’ [1986] 1 AC 785,
judgment of Lord Brandon of Oakbrook.
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III. Case Law
Contracts for future or unascertained goods therefore require an act
of appropriation to identify the goods as those of the contract. Until
the identification is made, the contract goods are unascertained. In
contracts for portion goods, a two-stage process leads to the specific
goods. First, when making the contract the parties must describe the
bulk from which they are to be supplied. Secondly, goods having
those characteristics must be separated from any bulk and irrevocably
appropriated to the contract. Once that has been done the seller loses
the right to supply any alternative goods, even if they have all the
described properties.
The completion of the first stage of the process is relevant for the
purposes of analysing risk and frustration26 and raises some inter-
esting questions but is insufficient to transfer ownership.
Where the goods are being held by a third party an instruction
from the seller to hold those goods on the buyer’s behalf may con-
stitute unconditional appropriation. In Wardars (Import & Export) Co
Ltd v W. Norwood & Sons Ltd 27 the agent of a seller of quasi-specific
goods gave the buyer a delivery note entitling him to collect the
goods. The buyer went to the place of storage and found the relevant
quantity of quasi-specific goods outside the warehouse awaiting col-
lection. He produced the delivery note and loaded the goods. The
goods had spoiled for want of refrigeration and the question for the
court was when property in the goods had passed. The court held that
property passed and the goods were unconditionally appropriated
when the delivery note was accepted and the goods on the pavement
were confirmed by the storage official to be the contract goods.
Harman LJ relied on s. 29(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 in so
deciding. Section 29(3) provides that
Where the goods at the time of the sale are in the possession of a third
person, there is no delivery by seller to buyer unless and until such
third person acknowledges to the buyer that he holds the goods on
his behalf.
The risk therefore passed at that time too. As Lord Justice Harman
confirmed, ‘risk prima facie passes with property’.
Where the seller himself continues to have possession of the goods,
he may earmark certain goods sufficiently so that they can be said to
have been unconditionally appropriated to the contract. However a
court’s reluctance to arrive at that conclusion, absent some com-
pelling and conclusive evidence, is clear from the case of Carlos
Federspiel & Co v Charles Twigg & Co.28 In that case a bicycle manu-
facturer had made some bicycles to the order of a purchaser and
26 R. Fitzpatrick, ‘Passing of Property’ (2004) Irish Student Law Review, http://
www.islr.ie/Reviews/2004/passing-of-property.php.
27 Wardar’s (Import & Export) Co Ltd v Norwood & Sons Ltd [1968] 2 QB 663.
28 Carlos Federspiel & Co v Charles Twigg & Co [1957] 1 L1 L Rep 240.
57
PROTECTING PRE-PAYING BUYERS OF UNASCERTAINED GOODS
packed them in boxes bearing that purchaser’s name. The bicycle
manufacturer became insolvent and the question before the court was
whether those bicycles had been unconditionally appropriated to the
purchaser. The court held that there had been no appropriation to
the buyer. The court considered the marking of the boxes as a selec-
tion by the seller of the goods he expected to use in performance of
the contract but not as an act demonstrating an intention to attach
the contract specifically to those goods.
The differing decisions in the last two cases described indicate that
the passing of property can turn on the most trivial of events. The
commercial uncertainty and perhaps unintended consequences may
not come to light until it is too late for the parties to alter the out-
come. In fact in Wardars Salmon LJ expresses the view that it ‘is
perhaps fortunate’ that the court did not have to decide whether
there was unconditional appropriation to the contract at the moment
when the goods were put on to the pavement. While one commenta-
tor29 has called for a change in judicial attitudes to s. 16, it would
seem to the authors that unequal or varied interpretations of s. 16
would cause greater uncertainty and that what is required is a
legislative amendment.
What is required for ‘unconditional appropriation’ is the ear-
marking of particular goods to the contract. Rule 5(2) provides that
delivery of the goods to the buyer or to a carrier consigned by the
buyer will suffice where no rights are reserved by the seller. However,
it is clear from Healey v Howlett & Sons 30 that delivery of a quantity of
goods to a carrier without identifying a subset of those goods for a
specific buyer will not amount to unconditional appropriation. In
Healey v Howlett & Sons the plaintiff had sent 190 boxes of fish to
London from Kerry. The fish had spoiled by the time the cargo arrived
in Holyhead, where it was to be divided among several buyers. The
defendant had ordered 20 boxes and the court had to decide on the
ownership of the fish on its arrival at Holyhead. The owner would
bear the loss of the fish. None of the boxes had been marked with the
defendant’s name and the court held that there was no appropriation
to him. Therefore the defendant had not become the owner of the 20
boxes of spoiled fish.
Where a contract is for the sale of quasi-specific goods, the only
real difference is that unconditional appropriation can take place
without any act of seller or buyer. This can arise from the principle of
exhaustion, where the bulk is reduced in some way leaving only the
goods described in the contract. The contract goods are thus identi-
fied by default. In The Elafi 31 Mustill J was heavily influenced by the
29 J. Crinion, ‘All that Glitters: Re Wait, Section 16 and the Peril for the Pre-paying
Buyer: Is it Time for a Fresh Approach?’ (2004) 4 University College Dublin Law
Review.
30 [1917] 1 KB 337.
31 [1982] 1 All ER at 208.
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judgment of Roche J in Wait and James v Midland Bank Ltd 32 which
acknowledged the possibility of ascertainment by exhaustion and
concluded that ascertainment had been achieved ‘automatically by
the facts’.
Acknowledging that a seller might rearrange goods for his own
record-keeping or management purposes, without deciding irrevoca-
bly to dispose of certain goods under a certain contract, the courts
seek convincing evidence of an unconditional appropriation. The case
of Cronin v IMP Midleton Ltd 33 must be treated with some reserve as
it is a tax case. In that case Carroll J was dealing with the passing of
property in unascertained goods and held that s. 18, Rule 1 did not
apply. She held that property did not pass when the contract was
made. Although the judge described the goods in question as un-
specific, she applied s. 17 and held that the goods were ascertained at
the time of delivery. She held that property was intended by the
parties to pass when the goods were delivered. However, the aim of
the Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 being interpreted
was to encourage export and so she held that the Revenue should not
be concerned whether property in the goods still vested in
the manufacturer.
In Flynn v Mackin and Mahon 34 the Supreme Court found there
had been no unconditional appropriation of a car which was crashed
en route to an agreed delivery and hand-over appointment. The Court
stated that nothing in the contract would have prevented the vendor
selling the car in question on the way to the appointment and pro-
viding an alternative car, of the same model and colour, to the
purchaser. The Court held, in spite of the provision to the purchaser of
the licence number of the car for the purposes of arranging insur-
ance, that there was no obligation to sell that particular car and so the
car had not been unconditionally appropriated to the contract. In light
of the Supreme Court also holding that this contract was not covered
by the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the comments, to a degree, must be
treated as obiter.
The apparently unjust consequences of the operation of s. 16 can
apply to consumers. In Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd 35 the sale
of wine to consumers as an investment provided the background to
the case. The wine was then stored by the vendor and the purchaser
paid storage and insurance costs to the vendor. However, the cases of
wine were not earmarked or identified as relating to any particular
contract of sale. Rather, all the cases of wine were stored together.
The company became insolvent and the customers’ subsequent claims
failed as the court held that the goods had not been identified with
the various contracts of sale and thus had not been ascertained. As
32 [1926] 24 L1 L Rep 313.
33 [1986] 3 Irish Tax Reports, 45.
34 [1974] IR 101.
35 1986 PCC 121.
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the goods had not been ascertained, s. 16 prevented the passing of
property in the wine to the consumers.
The Privy Council Decision in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd seems to
say that the New Zealand equivalent of s. 16 of the 1893 Act could
operate in certain circumstances to prevent the passing of legal or
equitable title in unascertained goods, regardless of the intention of
the parties.
The Elafi 36 shows a more flexible and pragmatic approach in that
‘ascertained’ is given a broad interpretation whereby the goods sub-
ject to the contract are ascertained in bulk, without any need for the 
goods to be physically allocated between separate contracts or for
the buyer to nominate which particular goods come from which
particular source.
To avoid potential problems with s. 16 it would seem necessary for
the goods to be ‘ascertained’ in some way. The contract could pro-
vide for notice of appropriation to be delivered to the buyer but that
would jeopardize the smooth running of commerce and involve addi-
tional cost.
While satisfying the ‘unconditional appropriation’ condition can be
difficult where one supplier is involved, it becomes really problematic
where the goods of two different suppliers are commingled for
supply. The difficulty is exacerbated where the goods are gas, oil,
wind energy or other commodities incapable of earmarking or dis-
tinction. In the event that four petroleum exploration companies drill,
extract gas, mix it on an offshore platform and sell it via the same
pipeline, how is property to pass from each of the four vendors to the
purchaser? Could they meter flow at the entry point between par-
ticular dates/times (e.g. dividing 24-hour clock proportionate to share-
holding) and thereby create an ascertainable divided share of a
particular vendor?
IV. English Legislative Amendment
Left judicially unchallenged, apart from the faint-hearted approach in
The Elafi,37 it was for the legislature to intervene. The Sale of Goods
(Amendment) Act 1995 (‘the 1995 Act’) altered the position under
English law. The 1995 Act inserts ss 20A and 20B and thereby adds a
new Rule 5(3) to s. 18 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which had
repealed the 1893 Act and which could be described as a consolidat-
ing Act. The effect of the amendment is to give a buyer an undivided
share in the unascertained goods, such share to be proportionate to
the amount paid by the buyer pursuant to the contract. This amend-
ment only assists a buyer who has partially or wholly prepaid for the
36 [1982] 1 All ER at 208 (QBD).
37 Ibid.
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goods and only applies to an undivided interest in a bulk or quasi-
specific good.
Burns makes the point that the amendment fell far short of the
radical changes made in the US by the abolition of reliance on
the concept of ‘property’.38 He also explains that the scope of the
amendment is likely to have resulted from the lobbying of a particular
industry group of commodity traders and hence the amendment was
very problem-specific. It is also to be noted that the amendments do
not legislate for seller insolvency and the possibility of a shortfall in
the undivided bulk.39
V. A Comparative Analysis
i. Ireland
The Sale of Goods Act 1893 contains detailed rules on the passing of
property and the timing of this primary objective of a contract for the
sale of goods.
While s. 17 provides the basic rule that property in the goods shall
pass when the parties to the contract intend it to pass, s. 16 of the Sale
of Goods Act 1893 provides that where there is a contract for the
sale of unascertained goods no property in the goods is transferred to
the buyer unless and until the goods are identified. The identification
must, by definition, take place at a later stage—after the making of
the contract. The rule in s. 16 is not subject to any agreement to the
contrary made between the parties, rather it is one of mandatory
application. This was decided in Jansz v G.M.B. Imports Pty Ltd.40
While identification establishes which are the contract goods, it
does not effect the transfer of property. However, once the goods are
thus ascertained, the issue of the passing of property ceases to be
problematic because the identification assists the passing of property
when the rules in s. 18 are applied. Prior to that act of ascertaining the
goods, it could not be said that someone had bought goods if the
parties were not in a position to identify which goods had been
bought, and sold. This is dictated by common sense, as Lord Mustill
stated,41 when stipulating that there could be no transfer of title to, or
property in, goods which cannot be identified. In fact Lord Mustill
went further and stated that:
It makes no difference what the parties intended if what they intend is
impossible: as is the case with an immediate transfer of title to goods
whose identity is not yet known.
38 T. Burns, ‘Better Late than Never: The Reform of the Law on the Sale of Goods
Forming Part of a Bulk’ (1996) 59 MLR 260.
39 Ibid. at 269.
40 [1979] VR 581.
41 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 at 90; [1994] 2 All ER 806 at 814 (PC).
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Section 16 prevents the transfer of property in goods to the buyer
until such time as those goods are ascertained; it is ss 17 and 18 that
govern the time at which that property is transferred.
While s. 17 states that property passes when the parties intend it to
pass, s. 18 provides a set of presumptions to govern the timing of
the passing of property in circumstances where the intention of the
parties is not clear. In other words, there may be an express or im-
plied term in the contract to the effect that property will pass at a
particular time. (This might be stated to take place when the goods
have been delivered or paid for.42) In the absence of any contrary
provision or intention of the parties, s. 18, Rule 5 of the 1893 Act
provides that:
Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods
by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state
are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller
with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the
seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. Such
assent may be express or implied and may be given either before or
after the appropriation is made.
The effect of Rule 5 is that an unconditional appropriation is required
for the passing of property in the goods. This means that after the act
constituting the unconditional appropriation, the contract goods must
be capable of being identified and all discretion to substitute them for
other goods must have ended.
The question arises as to what constitutes unconditional appropria-
tion. Rule 5 provides an example in so far as it states at subs. (2) that
there is unconditional appropriation where goods are delivered to the
buyer or to a carrier for transmission to him, without the seller re-
serving a right of disposal.
In essence therefore the Irish statutory provisions do not benefit
even from the limited amendment provided by the 1995 Act in the
United Kingdom. It is clear therefore that Irish commercial practice is
even more disadvantaged for the prepaying buyer.
ii. Canada
The primary remedy for a buyer in Canadian law is that of damages,43
though other remedies, which are not irreconcilable with the Sale of
Goods Act 1980, are still available in certain situations.44 Such rem-
edies are available either from common law or equitable doctrines
and any attempt to distinguish between the two sets of laws is
inappropriate.45
Section 52 of the 1980 Act specifically provides for the return
of money paid by a buyer where there has been a complete failure of
42 See Re Wait, above n.9.
43 See G. Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada, 5th edn (Carswell: Toronto, 2004).
44 Sale of Goods Act RSO 1980 s. 57 (Canada).
45 United Scientific Holdings v Burnley British Columbia [1977] 2 All ER 62 (HL).
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consideration. Thus, if the seller fails to deliver goods for which pay-
ment has been made, clearly the buyer can pursue an action for
money had and received.46 In Rowland v Divall 47 an action for money
had and received lay against the seller when the buyer had to sur-
render possession of the goods to the true owner. Canadian law goes
further and includes the doctrine of error in substantialibus. Thus in
O’Flaherty v McKinlay,48 where the goods consisted of a car which
was manufactured in the wrong year from that described, then an
action lay against the seller for money had and received even though
there was no fraud or deceit on the part of the seller.
Section 50 further provides the courts with a remedy of specific
performance where the goods are specific or ascertained, in such
circumstances as it sees fit. Considerable emphasis is placed on
whether or not the goods are specific or ascertained before such an
order will be granted. In Humboldt Flour Mills Co v Boscher 49 the
seller had contracted to supply the produce from an agreed quantity
of seed. However, since the buyer never alleged that there had
been any crop from the seed (nor in fact that it had actually ever been
planted) the court refused an order of specific performance on the
basis that the goods were neither specific nor ascertained. The Law
Reform Commission of Ontario formed the view that this restriction
was inequitable.50 It proposed that the legislation be amended to in-
clude the following provision:
In an action against the seller for breach of contract to deliver promised
goods, whether or not the goods existed or were identified at the time of
the contract, the court may direct that the contract be performed specifi-
cally and may impose such terms as to damages, payment of the price
and otherwise as seem just to the court.51
In reviewing the position in other jurisdictions, the Law Reform Com-
mission of Ontario was of the view that while the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) was preferable to the Canadian legislation, it did not
go sufficiently far enough. Its own proposal would considerably ex-
tend the protection available to buyers of future or unascertained
goods. It is opportune therefore to look at the approach of the UCC at
this stage.
iii. United States: Uniform Commercial Code
Although the English Sale of Goods Act 1893 has been exported in
substantial form throughout much of the common law world, this
46 Where a seller fails to deliver goods of the right identity or quality then the buyer
may also reject such goods (s. 12(2)) in addition to an action for money had and
received.
47 [1923] 2 KB 500 (CA).
48 [1953] 2 DLR 514 (Nld CA).
49 [1975] WWD 14 (Sask. QB).
50 OLRC Report Vol II 436–439.
51 Ibid., Draft Bill ss. 9–18.
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obviously did not happen in the United States. Instead American law
went its own way, first with the Uniform Sales Act and in more recent
times, and far more successfully, with the Uniform Commercial Code.
Primarily, the UCC relates to contracts for the sale of goods, or allied
transactions. Designed as a model code, it has been adopted in the
vast majority of states. Unfortunately, individual state law still governs
certain aspects, particularly that relating to personal bankruptcy,
which will impact significantly in the sort of transaction that we are
concerned with.
Sections 1–201(22) and (23) provide that if insolvency occurs before
the seller delivers the contract goods, the buyer is vested with the
power to retrieve those goods. When a buyer enters into a contract
governed by the UCC, he or she acquires an interest which is known
as ‘special property and insurable interest’ in the contract goods.
Such interest comes into existence only when the goods are identified
to the contract. Section 2–501(1) of the UCC states that goods become
identified to the contract by agreement between the parties, or failing
such agreement then in the case of existing goods when the contract
is made and in the case of future or unascertained goods, when the
goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as
identified with the contract.52 Moreover, the section goes on to pro-
vide that where a buyer has paid part or all of the price of such goods
he or she may, on making a tender of the unpaid portion of their price,
recover them from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten
days of the first instalment on their price.53
However, there are serious limitations on the usefulness of this
section. First, it requires that the goods have become identified to the
contract since the section requires that the buyer have a special
property in the goods.54 Second, the time period—ten days—within
which such rights must be exercised is exceptionally short. Third, and
perhaps more damaging of all, is that any such rights under this
section are of course subordinate to the rights of the trustee in
bankruptcy.
A classic application can be found in the Alabama case of Re
Bonner.55 Here the purchaser had a contract for the construction of a
fishing vessel with the vendor. At the time the contract was entered
52 Note, however, that Art. 2-501(1)(b) does not apply to contracts relating to crops
and livestock which are governed by specific provision of Art. 2-501(1)(c).
53 In the case of goods bought for family, household or personal use such recovery
may occur where the seller repudiates the contract or fails to deliver the goods in
accordance with the contract, s. 2-502(1)(a).
54 Section 2-501(1); see Re CSY Yacht Corp 42 BR 619, 39 UCC 879 (Bankr MD Fla
1984): no special property interest where goods not in existence at time of
bankruptcy.
55 < www.almb.uscourts.gov/Opinions/0530321.pdf#search = ‘Re%20CSY%20Yacht%
20Corp%20cour > (accessed 24 August 2006).
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
64
into, the vessel was not in existence, but shortly thereafter work com-
menced on its construction. Moreover the purchaser had made three
substantial instalment payments in the amount of $138,000 out of a
total price of $230,000. At that point the vendor filed for bankruptcy.
The purchaser now sought to establish title to the vessel by way of
proving a special property interest, whereas the trustee in bankruptcy
sought that it should be disposed of with the proceeds being
distributed among all the creditors. While the Alabama court held that
the purchaser had established a special property interest in the un-
finished vessel through identification, the purchaser failed to show
that they had tendered payment within the ten-day deadline. Al-
though the court admitted that the deadline would be difficult to
satisfy,56 it remained the fact that the purchaser produced no evidence
of even attempting to tender. Accordingly, the purchaser’s claim was
denied.
Failing the buyer having recourse to the above provisions, in bank-
ruptcy the buyer loses the option to use state law remedies to retrieve
goods.57 The buyer is an unsecured creditor who must wait their turn
for payment (on an unjust enrichment claim) or receipt of the goods
(because the item or items in question are not regarded as property of
the seller’s estate). The bankruptcy court would go to state law to
resolve these questions. Thus in Paoletti58 the court held that part
payment by the city of Oakland on two fire tenders conferred nothing
more on the purchaser than a claim against the bankrupt estate.
Section 2–716(3) provides a buyer with an additional right, essen-
tially the right of replevin,59 provided that the buyer can establish that
after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover.60 Cover is defined
as the making in good faith, and without unreasonable delay, any
reasonable purchase of, or contract to purchase, substitute goods.61 If
the buyer can effect cover then he or she is entitled to damages from
the seller for the difference between the price of the cover and that
under the contract together with incidental or consequential damages
less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach.62 The
56 In Bonner, the purchaser would have had to show that the vendor was insolvent
ten days from the payment of the first instalment, some two years before the
vendor went into bankruptcy! See also Re Surplus Furniture Liquidators 199 BR
136, 141 (Bankr MD NC 1995).
57 Section 362(a)(1) BRA.
58 205 BR 251 (Bankr ND Cal 1997).
59 Replevin is simply a judicially ordered recovery of the goods. At common law it
was confined to repossession of the goods in specie, but the modern formulation
also permits repossession of the goods or the value of the goods.
60 Or where the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort would be
unavailing or if the goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of
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right of replevin is of course also subject to the rights of the trustee
in bankruptcy.
V. Conclusion
Where a buyer enters into a contract for future goods then in general
the true remedy for the buyer in the event of a default by the seller is
compensatory in the form of damages. However, where a buyer has
prepaid for future goods, a compensatory remedy is unjust where the
seller becomes insolvent. Equity had recognized this distinction, albeit
perhaps too broadly. In Re Wait, certain contracts involving bills of
lading were held to be ineffective to pass the legal title in part of an
undivided whole to a purchaser because there was insufficient appro-
priation of the unascertained goods. The majority of the Court of
Appeal agreed with that proposition and Atkin LJ formulated it in
terms of the new legislative environment post 1893, denying any re-
sidual equitable jurisdiction as incompatible. In truth, however, the
1893 Act can never have been intended to overturn this doctrine in its
entirety, but the lack of any subsequent judicial challenge to the rea-
soning of Atkin LJ in Re Wait, with its exclusionary approach to the
application of the Act, had resulted in a de facto abolition of the emi-
nently sensible equitable doctrine. In its place, the requirement of
unconditional appropriation has been added in order to secure the
passing of property.
On the other side of the Atlantic in the United States, the Uniform
Sales Act originally governed the allocation of risk of loss in con-
tracts for the sale of goods. The approach of the Uniform Sales Act
was based on title. Risk of loss lay with whoever had title to the
goods. Unfortunately determining title was not an easy question. As
Llewellyn put it:
My brother Bacon has taught sales law for 28 years. When he says it
isn’t too difficult to determine where the court will decide the title is or is
going to be or should be, he is speaking a truth within limits for people
who have taught sales law for 28 years.63
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code essentially swept
away the use of title in allocation of risk of loss situations. Article 2 of
the UCC now covers contracts for the sale of goods. It is open to the
parties to make their own agreement as to where the risk of loss
should lie. Thus, finally Llewellyn’s commentary can be put to rest,
though for those not given to pre-emptive decision-making, the legis-
lative default provisions provide cold comfort.
Canadian jurisprudence likewise has moved cautiously away from
the turgid reading of the statutory provisions on sales law in England
63 Taken from: J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 4th edn (West
Publishing: St Paul, MN, 1995) 229
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and Ireland. There the Ontario Law Reform Commission has recom-
mended a sensible and reasonable change of limited import. This is
predicated upon more reasonable case law. It is suggested that the
time has come for the Irish legislature to accept the inadequacies of
the English approach to this issue and to move towards the proposals
from the Canadian Law Reform Commission.
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